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Introduction 
As with other organizations, political parties undergo continual evolution and reform; the 
process of reform may be undertaken in order to meet the changing circumstances of 
national and global economies.  At the same time a political party may change so that it can 
more readily fulfil the needs and expectations of the electorate. The focus of this paper will 
be the reasons for the deliberate change undertaken by the British Labour Party (BLP) over 
a number of decades and through diverse electoral fortunes.  The period to be investigated 
in this paper is the years between 1982 and 2010 when the party, after languishing on the 
opposition benches governed for 13 years but was then consigned to the opposition benches 
after suffering defeat to the Conservatives in May 2010.  It could legitimately be argued 
however that, for the BLP, the period of greatest reform is the early 1990s and focussed 
attention will be given to this period, especially the leadership transition from Neil Kinnock 
to John Smith and finally to Tony Blair.  This paper intends to widen understanding of the 
evolving precepts and philosophies underpinning the BLP and the imperatives that have 
driven and shaped it.  Its focus will be the BLPs desire to become and remain electable after 
a long period of opposition from 1979 to 1997. In pursuing this issue, this paper proposes 
that the BLP‘s leadership engaged with a complex relationship with the party‘s ideological 
and institutional history, and that there was some degree of interplay between the history 
and the reform of the party.  This paper traces some of the processes and ideas at work as 
the British Labour Party systematically undertook reform of key structures and key 
ideological statements, perhaps the most significant being the repeal of Clause Four, the 
statement from 1918 on production and capital that Tony Blair removed from the Party‘s 
constitution.  This paper will also consider the implications of the Iraq war and its 
contribution to Blair‘s defeat.   
 
Reforming the Party 
Attention to political reform inevitably draws attention to parties fighting elections.  
Electoral success, as the political scientist Andy McSmith points out, is an obvious quest for 
any political party.  Using Tony Blair as an exemplar, he argues that it is a natural 
assumption that ‗the purpose of democratic political activity is to be in government.‘2 After 
all, a party can accomplish nothing from the opposition benches.  But the interpretation of 
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this goal reveals an underlying significance.  The reforms of the BLP, achieved by the 
transformational leadership of Tony Blair, were partly determined by the political context 
of the party.  In a reform process ineluctably linked to both electability and leadership, Blair 
wished to assert the identity of his party in a political climate determined by the ideological 
right. Reforms of the BLP took place in a context defined by the consistent electoral success 
of the Conservative Party and the electoral endorsement of Thatcherite ideology.  
Concomitant to this was the disendorsement of left wing politics.  Andrew Scott points 
outthat ‗1983 was [the year that] British Labour under Michael Foot crashed to its lowest 
vote for more than 60 years.‘ 3   As Tony Benn, a former Labour MP, stated in a 
contemporary diary entry, ‗the scale of the losses [for the BLP] is enormous.‘4  Margaret 
Thatcher also illustrates the predicament of the Labour Party in 1983.  Her personal 
analysis of the electoral data revealed that ‗the size of our victory became clearer and clearer.  
It really was a landslide.  We had won a majority of 144: the largest of any party since 
1945.‘5 
Although the reasons for BLP reform may be complex, it is possible to distinguish 
one main political reason behind the reforms in the BLP: the desire to become electable.  
For instance, with regard to the BLP, Ivor Crewe and Anthony King point out that the 
transformation of the party owed much to the relationship it wished to forge with voters, 6 
and therefore to the need for electability.  It is upon this point that this paper‘s argument 
will turn and it will provide the broad focus for this discussion.  The process of reform in 
Britain is demonstrated in the response of the BLP to the heritage of Labourism.  The 
implication of the party wishing to become electable is rarely given the critical analysis that 
it deserves.  Attendant upon this issue is the significance of the historical context and the 
focus upon political leadership which arises from this context.      
It is significant that an often successful accommodation of left-wing heritage 
contextualizes the BLP‘s reforms, a point neglected by scholars who have suggested that 
party reform was achieved at the expense of party history.  By emphasizing this point, this 
paper departs from many previous critiques of modern Labour, which are encapsulated by 
Benn, who declared as early as 1990 that the party had instituted ‗explicit, ideological 
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rejection of socialism.‘7  His assessment stands in contrast to his summation in 1983, where 
he had perceived that the party was reverting to socialism.8  In Benn‘s opinion, by the 1990s 
there was a paradigm shift in the ideological underpinnings of the party.  Whether revelling 
in its drawbacks or engaged in defence of it, many commentators have stressed the 
dissonance between Old and New Labour, as if to suggest that the causes of change were of 
a kind which implied a complete occlusion between Labour‘s past and present.  By opposing 
these arguments, this paper is of course not suggesting that modern Labour is mired in the 
past.  Labour leaders, as scholarly consensus indicates, are preoccupied with and cognizant 
of the need for reform.  Paradoxically, in Britain this was accomplished by Blair‘s 
articulation of a conservative vision.  Yet he defined the essence of New Labour, and 
asserted its identity, in the face of a right-wing political context, by drawing upon and 
incorporating earlier reformist tenets.   
Accordingly, a component of this paper‘s argument is that a consideration of Blair‘s 
conservative enunciations articulates the causes of change in the BLP.  The tendency of 
Blair‘s vision was to draw upon the reformist legacy of men such as Clement Attlee, Harold 
Wilson and, most importantly, Anthony Crosland; Blair‘s agenda was reformist, but he 
drew upon the reforms of the 1960s and earlier.  Accordingly there has been some successful 
incorporation of old labour traditions into the new party.  Critics who use terms such as 
‗crisis‘9 in Labour leadership or philosophy demonstrate the pessimistic interpretation of 
New Labour and its relationship with social democracy.  However, contrary to the cynical 
interpretations of the labour parties, it can be deemed that the exchange of ideas between 
old and new sheds light on both the current state of the BLP and the causes of the reforms 
which have been put into place.   
Of course, Blair, Anthony Giddens, Gordon Brown and other so-called ‗architects‘ of 
New Labour drew inspiration from other sources beyond their immediate history: America 
and Australia are notable instances.  In Britain, both the future of the party and the 
ideological underpinnings which will guide its future are long-standing issues of debate by 
both academics and politicians. The direction in which the BLP‘s policies have been pointed 
has inspired much discussion, because of the deliberate nature of this change and because of 
its implications for the future of labourism and socialism in Britain.  Blair discusses the 
implementation of the New Labour brand as follows: 
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At one point there was even talk of compromise, ‗new Labour‘, i.e. no 
capital N.  And it wasn‘t as trivial a point as you might think: New 
Labour with a capital N was indeed like renaming the party. 10 
 
Blair‘s point testifies to the perception among some party members that historical linkages 
were being removed, yet, as will become apparent, this was not strictly the case. 
 
Imperatives for reform 
With regard to the British Labour Party, several commentators have advanced the finding 
that the turning point for Labour came after the 1992 election defeat that many argue 
should never have happened.  Heffernan and Marqusee argue that:  
Labour‘s failure to win the 1992 general election, in the midst of the 
most severe economic recession since the 1930s and against a party 
that had been in government for thirteen years, mystified many 
people, not least the pollsters, whose predictions had been grossly 
awry.11 
 
This defeat highlighted significant problems for the party. Given the unpopularity of the 
Tory Government at the time led by John Major it had been widely assumed that victory 
would be inevitable and Labour‘s failure to win stunned many commentators.  After this 
electoral loss a team was dispatched to America to observe Clinton‘s successful 1992 
campaign.  David Michie explains that ‗Labour sent over a group of agents to observe the 
Democrats‘ workings at first hand; the result was a report which formed the blueprint for 
Labour‘s phenomenal 1997 campaign.‘12 
Leadership aspirants within the BLP articulated the electoral imperatives 
underpinning the reform process.  Notably Tony Blair was able to identify wider historical 
and social problems facing the party.  He argued that:  
The collapse of the Labour Party and its electoral base, most 
painfully dramatised by the 1992 defeat, was only the most obvious 
sign of a broader shift in politics and society.  Labour stuttered when 
confronted by the new world that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s: a 
more diverse, more fractured society; new industries and new 
attitudes to work and consumption; and an international order that 
was both more integrated and yet more unpredictable.13 
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Blair‘s analysis showed his recognition that, particularly at a time of profound change, 
policy reform may be necessary.  His assessment takes us beyond Fishman‘s simpler ideas 
that Blair simply wished to become electable, and broadens the focus to the notion that 
policy adjustments have always been an essential part of the need for change.. 
Blair is credited with the sole objective of conducting a victorious election campaign 
in 1997. He has been recognized for spearheading much of the reform of the party that led 
up to this election; his goal from the moment he assumed the leadership was to secure 
victory.  Alan Watkins uses electoral data to affirm that ‗Tony Blair [was] the most 
successful leader of any radical party in the 20th century.‘ 14The commentator Peter Riddell 
points out that the 1997 victory and the BLP‘s reforms were conjoined.  As he wrote in The 
Times ‗the key to the Labour victory is the ―reinvention‖ of the party over the past few 
years.‘15  This was not something that occurred ‗in a moment of history‘: it was a considered, 
evolutionary change. David Michie considers that:  
The transformation of the Labour Party from the discredited 
wreckage of the late Seventies to the dynamic and ruthlessly effective 
New Labour of the new millennium was a remarkable achievement.  It 
is probably fair to say that the process of change, begun under Neil 
Kinnock and continued during John Smith‘s brief stewardship, only 
really came to fruition once Tony Blair was elected leader in 1994.16 
 
Michie‘s observation is a worthwhile reminder that critiques of New Labour tend to iterate 
the modernity inherent in this particular conceptualization of left-wing politics.   
While the imperatives for change are complex, it is, perhaps, not surprising that 
many analysts are sceptical of the reasons for the reforms.  Some attentions to these 
responses show their potential to perceive a dissonance between ‗Old‘ and ‗New‘ Labour.  
Among others, in her contribution to the book The Blair Agenda, Nina Fishman focuses on 
the modernization of the BLP, criticizing what she believes to be the superficiality of Blair‘s 
reform process.  She expresses the belief that pragmatic, indeed coldly logical, reasons 
informed the transformation of the Party.17 She has asserted that the reform of the party 
was purely to win elections.  Polly Toynbee and David Walker concur, pointing to the 
persistence of this interpretation in much New Labour discourse.  They dismiss the Third 
Way as a ‗convenient fog.‘18 
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While Fishman expresses scepticism about the reason for change, and Blair asserts 
that the reasons were both valid and principled, Anthony Giddens highlights the complex 
nature of the rationale behind them.  He claims that ‗Political surveys in this country and 
elsewhere show that the... shift from Old to New Labour... [was] crucially important in 
persuading key categories of voters to switch their votes.‘19  In other words, the changes 
were essential to attain electoral victory, and Giddens asserts a point central to many 
analyses of Blair, the Third Way and New Labour. 
The terms upon which reform proceeded and the ideological substance of these 
reforms, are both significant.  The opinion expressed in The Times‘s editorializing lends 
support to the notion that Blair drew upon his predecessors in the 1950s and 1960s as 
transmitting the ideology upon which his reforms rested.  The Times cites Blair‘s declaration 
that Labour then had to be ‗a party that is capable of building a new coalition of support in 
the country that reaches out beyond its traditional boundaries of support to be a vehicle for 
the national renewal that I want to see.‘20  This statement, delivered in the immediate 
context of Blair‘s 1997 victory, exists alongside Blair‘s declaration that ‗I know what this is 
a vote for.  It‘s a vote for the future.  It‘s not a vote for outdated dogma or ideology.‘21  This 
apparent juxtaposition shows how Blair harnessed the heritage of the BLP and used it to 
proclaim a modernising reformist message.  Blair chose his words carefully.  He was eager 
to stress the vitality of his vision; nonetheless it was one which resonated with one, liberal, 
interpretation of Labour history, in which unionism was subordinate to the claims of social 
democracy and nationalism.   
At this juncture, it is necessary to turn more precise attention to the political forces 
to which Blair was indebted.  As was explained earlier, New Labour was not a deviation 
from traditional Labour thinking; it found its matrix between forces which may be described 
as ‗contrapuntal‘.  Maurice Mullard, an academic and commentator, gives support to this 
argument.  He asserts that ‗New Labour can be defined as being the process which moves 
the Labour Party into the political contours shaped by the 18 year conservative legacy.‘22  It 
is significant that Blair‘s perspective on Britain‘s conservative legacy has been identified as a 
component of his party since his government took office.  Writing in May, 1997, Riddell 
pointed out that Blair accepted ‗the broad policy framework of the Thatcher and Major 
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years.‘23  Blair sought to clarify the differences between the BLP and Thatcherism, arguing 
that ‗Britain under the Conservatives was a long way from lofty ideals.‘ 24 John Gray 
contradicts this point of Blair‘s, arguing that ‗In fact, under Blair‘s leadership, New Labour 
has turned out to be not so much a successor to Thatcherism as a continuation of 
it.‘25Paradoxically reformist and conservative, Blair drew upon the past because of the need 
to redefine the BLP within a political context determined from the right wing.  In so doing, 
Blair nonetheless incorporated components of Labour heritage into New Labour.     
In Britain, a significant component of the Third Way was the repeal of Clause Four, 
which loosened the connections between the party and the unions.   Clause Four, written by 
Sidney Webb and thus coming from an intellectual and political circle that included 
luminaries such as Beatrice Webb and H.G. Wells, was a venerable and entrenched 
statement of Labour ideology.  In essence, it declared the merits of workers gaining from 
their labours and advocated the ‗ownership of common means of production, distribution 
and exchange.‘26 As Tony Blair himself narrates and appreciates, the repeal of Clause Four 
was a flashpoint and a faultline, and it is this act, whereby Blair advocated its repeal at a 
Labour Party Conference, that is mostly responsible for perceptions of New Labour as 
jettisoning the old.  Tony Blair recalls the conference where Clause Four was repealed:  
I had wanted to do it right at the end of my conference speech, and 
so inflammatory was it certain to be that we decided not to say it in 
the bald terms  ‗Clause IV is going to be abandoned‘ . This was not 
because we didn‘t dare to say it outside of the hall, but to say it in the 
hall itself could provoke a really adverse reaction which might mar 
the whole event. 27 
 
Of course, the conference when Clause Four was debated and then repealed was not the first 
time that the Party and its conferences had embarked upon both institutional and 
ideological revisions, a point that is a necessary corrective to accounts of New Labour which 
see the conference vote on Clause Four as being of singular and unprecedented significance.  
After the 1979 defeat, and the replacement of Callaghan as leader by Michael Foot, the 
conference articulated the need for significant change within the Party, including 
democratizing its processes. 28  John Gray explains that ‗New Labour launched a bold 
campaign to reshape its public image that reached its high point when in 1995 Blair 
persuaded the party to remove Clause Four (mandating ―common ownership of the means of 
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production, distribution and exchange‖) from its constitution.‘29  Blair‘s recent volume of 
memoirs recalls the vitriol of the debate and the divisions in party ranks, but also Blair‘s 
ideological commitment to removing Clause Four as a specific statement, while more 
generally adhering to traditional party structures and beliefs.30 
Maurice Mullard provides a description rather than a definition:  
Labour‘s Third Way is perceived to be a break with the emphasis on 
collectivism of past Labour Governments and the concentration on 
markets of Conservative Governments.  The Third Way is perceived 
to be the politics that seeks to address the challenges of the 
globalised economy – the Third Way reflects the hopes and 
aspirations of post modernity.31 
 
Mullard‘s point returns attention to the transformative potential in New Labour and 
the Third Way, and the impact of transformative leadership in achieving ideological 
and institutional change to adapt to shifting political and social circumstances.  Blair 
provides the following justification for the repeal of Clause Four: 
Clause IV didn‘t represent a constraint but an invitation to 
unfettered indulgence.  It was not healthy, wise or, unfortunately, 
meaningless.  At a certain level, it meant a lot and the meaning was 
bad.  Changing it was not a superficial thing; it implied a significant, 
deep and lasting change to the way the party thought, worked and 
would govern. 32 
 
The rationale that would once have underpinned this aspect of the Labour manifesto had 
been subverted and even debased.  Surprisingly, however, both Giddens and Fishman, 
perhaps two of the most significant yet contradictory commentators on New Labour, fail to 
perceive the paradox underpinning New Labour.  Of course, Fishman is right to stress the 
importance of winning elections as having underscored, or been the progenitor of, Labour 
reforms.  Yet Fishman, viewing Blair‘s actions from a Marxist perspective, does not 
recognize that Blair espoused reform by means of a conservative vision.  Such a vision had 
been a consistent aspect of Blair‘s public utterances on policy and on the Labour Party. In 
other words, the changes were essential to attain electoral victory. As shadow home 
secretary before winning the 1994 leadership contest, Blair took on the Conservative Party 
overwhat has traditionally been one of its policy strengths: the maintenance of law and 
order.  Vowing to combat rising crime figures, Blair promised via a slogan that he would be 
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‗tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime‘.33 Yet as Pilkington points out, beyond the 
banality of the slogan was a more nuanced reaction to crime and the social factors 
underpinning many anti-social activities.  Pilkington reminds us that Blair‘s policies in this 
field were intended not to sound soft, but neither were they intended to sacrifice Labour‘s 
traditional emphasis on social justice.  They were in fact poised between at times contesting 
and contradictory forces, a situation that recalls much of the creation of New Labour, in 
which some of the new ideas came from received wisdom. 
 
Election 2010: What went wrong?  
In May 2010, 13 years of Labour being in power came to an end with the election of David 
Cameron as the Conservative prime minister. It has been postulated by Blair that the main 
reason for the collapse of the Labour party was the abandonment of the New Labour brand.  
Blair offers the following assessment of what went wrong for Labour:   
Labour won when it was New Labour.  It lost because it stopped 
being New Labour… This is not about Gordon Brown as an 
individual… Had he pursued New Labour policy, the personal issue 
would still have made victory tough, but it wouldn‘t have been 
impossible.  Departing from New Labour made it so… 2010 was one 
we were never going to win – once the fateful strategic decision was 
taken to abandon the New Labour position. 34 
 
There is not now time to give full consideration to the validity of Blair‘s assessment, but the 
defeat of New Labour by conservatism does bring us full circle in terms of the electoral 
fortunes of New Labour and the Third Way.  The Iraq war was undeniably a factor in the 
defeat of Blair.  The story of Blair‘s and Britain‘s involvement in this war has been well told, 
but merits brief analysis.  As Collins points out, Blair‘s engagement with Middle Eastern 
crises long predated the election of George W. Bush as President of the United States of 
America in 2001, even though Bush is the President most commonly linked with Blair‘s 
name in assessments of the Iraq War.  Blair had nonetheless supported Bill Clinton, Bush‘s 
predecessor, in airstrikes against Afghanistan and the Sudan in pursuit of Osama Bin Laden, 
who was then becoming known as a significant figure in terrorist circles.35  But following 
the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, Blair‘s foreign policy and 
diplomacy became inextricably associated with Bush‘s so-called ‗War on Terror‘.  Thomas 
Lansford calls Blair ‗one of the closest allies of U.S. president George W. Bush‘ and notes 
the importance of British diplomatic activity to securing, at least initially, the support of 
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other European powers for intervention in Iraq, even if this was expected to be done 
through the UN and not result in regime change.36  The longer term implications of Blair‘s 
involvement was the dramatic decline in his popularity as Prime Minister, one concomitant 
with Bush‘s as President, and it is hard to locate in Blair‘s final years as Prime Minister any 
significant emphasis in public discourse on the transformative social agenda that had 
originally defined New Labour. 
 
Conclusion 
Iraq is not the only issue on which Blair should be remembered.  Blair considers that: ‗of 
course, you can point to the fatigue after thirteen years, the loss of trust over Iraq, the wear 
and tear that comes with power, but none of those things is determinative.‘ 37However it is 
an important point to remember that the conservatives remained in power for over thirteen 
years. ‗The Tories‘ 1992 victory shows it is possible for a party to win again despite thirteen 
years in power.  It could have been done.  The 2010 election was our equivalent of 1992, not 
1997.‘ 38What the Labour Party of the 1980s and especially the 1990s presents to us is one 
engaged on the active reform, reform where the motivation for it and its implications for the 
identity of the Party are widely debated, but it is possible to take assessments further than 
the obvious imperative of winning elections; the way Blair in particular sought to re-orient 
the Party took place as part of a complex interplay of transformative leadership and the 
social justice heritage of the Party as well as simply electability.   
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